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Pretence 
In the early 19th century many of the academic subjects of our time 
had not taken shape. Then, to be a polymath, was a difficult ideal, 1 but 
still we tend to think that some succeeded. Now, after two centuries 
with its growth, differentiation and shifts of academic subjects things 
have changed dramatically. Subjects characterized by a prolonged pro­
fessional training as well as sustained practical experience are almost 
sealed off to academics from other fields. This is especially so in the 
natural sciences, where someone trained in physics would not think of 
venturing into, for instance, pharmacy, where he has no training. The 
demands and standards of one discipline cannot be passed by and inter­
disciplinarity here invariably means to cooperate with experts than to 
dabble into the other field oneself. 
In comparison, subjects from amongst the humanities are considered 
more accessible to outsiders. Here someone with a general academical 
training and expertise in one field can hope to understand the methods 
ofthe respective other field so as to be able to contribute to some extent 
to it. However, philologies remain an exception, since training in a phil­
ological discipline requires considerable and prolonged effort. In this 
respect, traditional philologies can be compared to the natural sciences: 
a dilettante is often spotted simply by the type of errors, usually basic 
1 "Es ist wahr, viele Untersuchungen nehmen in unserm Zeitalter eine solche Wend­
ung, daß Universalität dazu gefordert wird; diese besitzt aber niemand vollkommen: 
warum zieht man also nicht zuvor die Kundigen zu Rath?" August Wilhelm Schlegel, ir 
a letter to Wilhelm Humboldt (19.3.1823). 
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errors, he commits. More recently, with the North-American ostraciz­
ing of philology, a whole syndicate of philological di1ettantes2 has taken 
over to explain why even the term philology is or should no more be in 
use,3 or why philology and its method of textual criticism is racist,4 or 
even has layed the intellectual foundation of the holocaust. For study­
ing ancient or foreign cultures training in the respective philology was 
consequently deemed dispensible.5 
Concurrent to this "opening" of disciplinary boundaries there is an 
insecurity about the methods to be employed. An unbounded relativ­
ism has become fashionable, one that understands all truth claims as 
relative to a specific social group.6 While this is obviously applicable 
to many such claims with which Sanskritists deal (monotheism against 
polytheism etc.), it becomes plainly absurd in others. The notion that 
the Puräl).ic cosmological model can be an alternative truth to the scien­
tific one can only be entertained in an environment where creationism 
is held by many as a viable alternative to current scientific research on 
the history of the universe. 7 
As in many other subjects, in Indian studies such conflicts can be 
solved without too much disruption: Vedic air-craft, Yogic miracles etc. 
were studied without examining its truth claims, but as a Iiterary, social or 
other phenomenon. The problematic type of relativism comes in when we 
give up the scientific truth claim entirely rather than suspend it temporar­
ily, or in certain circumstances. We can accept and work on the assump­
tion that the group we are studying believes that the Bible was written by 
and is thus literally the work of God, but as far as practical and scientific 
2 Heidrun Brückner and Karin Steiner have recently expressed their commitment not
to leave the interpretation of the history of Indology to scholars outside the field: "L ... J 
die Rückgewinnung der Deutungshoheit über diese sind unverzichtbar [ . . . ]"In their in­
troduction to: 200 Jahre Indienforschung - Geschichte(n), Netzwerke, Diskurse. Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz 2012, p. 6. 
' See Patrick Olivelle: "Material Culture and Philology: Semantics of Mining in An­
cient lndia." In JAOS 132.1 (2012), p. 23. 
4 For examples, see Reinhold Grünendahl: "Post-philological Gestures - 'Decon­
structing' Textual Criticism." In: WZKS 52-53 (2009-2010), p. 17-27. 
5 I am not talking here ofthe non-philological disciplines in the study ofwhat is now
called an "area", since they play no role in what follows. 
6 For the critique of this position, see Sokal as quoted below. 
7 This point is made by the New York based physicist Sokal, see below. 
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questions are concerned we assume human authors at work and therefore 
consider textual criticism a valid method. Theologians of earlier centuries 
have not, and fundamentalists of the present may not, agree and this is 
why different philologies, or indeed "Religionswissenschaft" ( contrary 
to some forms of "religious studies"), have freed themselves from the 
embrace ofbelief systems, and become a secular discipline. 
In (Indian) philology, as in law, in many cases truth cannot possi­
bly be relative: the identity of a murderer may be unknown, doubtful, 
but it is not relative to the observer. We can only distinguish between 
facts we can establish beyond any reasonable doubt (as the date of 
Varähamihira), questions that have to remain open in absence of suf­
ficient evidence (the exact date of the Buddha), and religious beliefs 
(the law ofkarma), which we do not want to treat reductionistically by 
subjecting them to an inappropriate method of interpretation. lt is, for 
instance, problematic to reduce religious visions of saints, take for in­
stance Hildegard von Bingen, to physical or mental disorders or natural 
phenomena. And it is likewise absurd to declare the Native Americans' 
own mythological account ofthe origin of man a scientific truth against 
anthropological evidence simply for supporting their political claims 
(that are in any case valid without them).8 
On the basis of such reasonings it has mostly been possible in Indian 
philology to recognize pretence to learning, dilettantism or religious 
fanaticism. Max Lindenau's work on Bhäsa was acknowledged as a 
contribution to lndological research, but when he gave a lecture in Mar­
burg about the occultist connections between the New Testament and 
Buddhism, he was dismissed from university.9 In other words, with so­
her philology as a common ground, it is often not difficult to tel1 genu­
ine research from pseudo-science. An Indologist with a decent training 
is prepared to recognize for instance whether a new decipherment of 
the Indus script is academically sound or whether someone without ad­
equate training has tried for whatever reason to venture into Indology. 
8 This interesting example is given by Sokal. 
9 See Jürgen Hanneder: Indologie im Umbruch. Zur Geschichte des Fad1es in Marburg 
1845-1945. Antrittsvorlesung. München: Kirchheim Verlag 2010 (lndologica Marpurgen­
sia 1), p. 30-32. 
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An interesting scienti:fic scandal in another field has more recently 
shown that relativism has opened wide the door to a new academic 
dilettantism. One possible outcome of the loss of clear criteria of what 
one's own discipline is and entails is exemplified in the famous "Social 
Text affair" .10 Here a physicist assembled material from fashionable 
studies on the sociology of science in such a convincing manner that 
the editors of the joumal Social Text accepted his piece of writing, fail­
ing to grasp that it was a parody, into which he had purposely planted 
absurd errors. In a complementary study Sokal and a colleague have 
analyzed mathematical examples and arguments in the writings of a 
series of influential French authors, as Lacan, Baudrillard and others 
and exposed their pretence to interdisciplinary leaming to impress their 
unsuspecting readers. 11 
But the "hoax" also showed that the failure was not individual, but 
collective, since it became clear that one academic discipline (sociolo­
gy) had started its own multidisciplinary project (sociology of science) 
without sufficient grasp of the disciplinary side, the internal "discourse" 
of the subject of their study. lt seems exact sciences like mathematics 
prove a difficult object for such relativistic treatment. 
The pattern is interesting for other fields. Dilettante intrusions start 
on the assumption that an outsider can better determine the position of 
one subject's methodology with respect to that of others (which may 
be true in some cases), but are often combined with an inadequate un­
derstanding of those methods, which renders the whole exercise futile 
from the perspective of the subject involved. From the perspective of 
such an analysis from a supposedly superior level, a thorough under­
standing ofthe methods of the subject-which are after all thought to be 
no more than a discourse limited to a specific peer group - is of course 
of only moderate interest. The adherents of the subject beg to differ. In 
the field of mathematics the proof that an author has no clue what he 
is talking about is, as we leam from Sokal, 12 not too difficult. Sanskrit 
w See Alan Sokal: Beyond the Hoax. Science, Philosophy and Culture. Oxford Univer­
sity Press 2008. 
11 Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont: Fashionable Nonsense. Postmodem lntellectuals' 
Abuse of Science. New York: Picador 1998. 
12 See below.
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Philology is in this respect like an exact science. 
Take the following passage from a review by Vishva Adluri of a 
work by Angelika Malinar on the Bhagavadg'itä, where the correct in­
terpretation of the compound räjavidyä is discussed: 13 
In the introduction, Malinar claims that the "specific knowledge" K.r�i;ia re­
veals "is called rii,iavidyii, the "knowledge of kings" or royal knowledge" (12; 
cf. also 145)-a grammatically questionable translation. Compounds of the 
form rii,ia- (e.g., riija-danta) are best translated as "best of' or "highest." Päi;i ni 
sütra 2.2.3 (ra,iadantiidi�u param) applies here. The usual order is inverted in 
riija- compounds and the upasai:jana moves to the end. Accordingly, rii,iadanta 
is not "the tooth ofkings" but "eyetooth." Räjavidyii should be translated as "the 
best of knowledges" rather than as "the knowledge of kings," as Malinar does. 
A general reader, or one only superficially acquainted with Sanskrit 
philology, will get the impression that the author has commited a gram­
matical error that can be solved by referring to the grammar of Päl).ini 
in the way the reviewer does. But an expert can spot immediately that 
Päl).ini is quoted here only to bedazzle the unsuspecting reader. Firstly 
Sütra 2.2.31 (not 3) oftheA$/ädhyäy'i does not stipulate that compounds 
starting in räja- have an inversion oftheir components, but merely that 
the items in the list (ga�a) that starts with räjadanta - a ]ist with 59 
items, in which no other starts in räja - display such an irregularity. If 
we see this list as an example list (äkrtiga�a) then other similar exam­
ples can be exceptionally formed, but no more. Everything eise would 
be absurd, for- as a glance at a dictionary and Sanskritic common sense 
suggests - most compounds starting in räja- presuppose no such inver­
sion, as räjakumära etc. etc. 
As every student leams in the first year of Sanskrit, the interpretation 
of some compounds require careful weighing of arguments. Therefore 
the self-confidence in this interpretation by the reviewer can be taken 
as an indication that he has not mastered even basic Sanskrit. What is 
worse, while charging others with not taking notice of the indigenous 
13 The Bhagavadgita: Doctrines and Contexts. By Angelika Malinar. Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 2007. Reviewed by Vishva Adluri in: History <�( Religions 50.1 
(2010), p. 104. 
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interpretations of Indian texts, 14 he remains utterly ignorant of the fact 
that the many commentaries on the passage are here in disagreement. 
And to his Iack of expertise in Sanskrit he adds one in Indological sec­
ondary literature. Had he not arrogantly rejected - the second part of 
this article explains why this is the case - a review ofthe same wo rk 
a decade earlier, 15 he would have found the interpretations of the com­
pound by classical Indian commentators neatly analyzed and catego­
rized. He would have noticed, what every beginning student of Sanskrit 
might expect, namely, that there is no single interpretation of räjavidyä, 
on the contrary one finds commentators on the passage explaining a 
variety of grammatically viable resolutions of the compound, as räjä 
vidyänäm, räjrtäl'fl vidyä and even räjä cäsau vidyä ca. 
Of course, such indications of philological failure should not be 
blown out of proportion. 16 But in the case at hand, this is only the be­
ginning. Take, for instance, the author's apodictic introduction to a new 
interpretation of the Mahäbhärata: "The Mahäbhärata addresses the 
individual reader. This has important methodological consequences for 
the way we read the text: it cannot become the object of a generalizing 
analysis that attempts to find things that are 'objectively' true in it. The 
methods of historiography and the historico-critical human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften), themselves modeled on those of the posi­
tive sciences, cannot apply here." 17 Or: "Tue Cartesian approach to the 
Mahäbhärata contrasts sharply with the Indian approach. Tue Indian 
approach does not recognize the Cartesian distinction between res cogi­
tans and res extensa." 18 Especially in view ofhis inability to interpret 
Sanskrit texts, his plea for an Indian approach cannot be taken too seri­
ously. Tue Indian approach to the Mahäbhärata is contained in works, 
for which a decent knowledge of Sanskrit is required. As Iong as his so-
14 See below. 
15 Walter Slaje's review of the same work in: Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 22 
(1999), p. 131-166. 
16 Especially since Sanskritists have a reputation of doing that, as we leam from the 
conflict of Max Müller with Böhtlingk, Roth and Whitney, where a desperate publisher 
wrote: "[ ... ] da die Herren Sanskritisten zornige Leute sind, die gerne aus einer Mücke
einen Elephanten machen [ ... ]" See the article of Agnes Stache-Weiske in 200 Jahre Indi­
enforschung - Geschichte(n), Netzwerke, Diskurse. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2012, p. 85. 
17 Vishva Adluri: Sacrificial Ontology and Human Destiny in the Mahäbhärata. Unpub­
lished version of January 2009 sent to me by the author, p. 33. 
18 Ibid., p. 37.
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called "Indian approach" contains speculations like the following, we 
need not deal with it in depth: "The Mahäbhärata itself explicitly indi­
cates that the later narrative is a meta-text: it refers to Utanka's teacher, 
Veda, as the upädhyäya (teacher), a possible play on upa-adhyäya. Upa 
means "above", or "meta", adhyäya means chapter." 19 No further ex­
planation for such an interpretation which exposes its maker as a philo­
logical dilettante is required here. 
While the Sanskritist may work according to the dictum müle hate 
sarva1J1 hatam,20 and dismiss the rest, we may enquire whether these 
again are singular instances, and whether there is something substantial 
beyond the basics of Sanskrit Studies. So Jet us see see his new method­
ological principles for studying the Mahäbhärata: "l. The philosophi­
cal approach to the text constitutes the most universal henneneutic ho­
rizon possible for reading it; and 2. Tue reason for taking the text to 
be a unified whole, ultimately, is not based on philological arguments, 
but on the unity of this horizon. Because the Mahäbhärata's unity is a 
plJilosoplJical, an a P!iori unity,_ it can only_be challeng�d at the level oc 
a philosophical refutation of this unity."21 
In his conclusion he goes even further in saying: 
1. The Mahäbhärata expresses neither a "naive" nor a "primitive" belief in
the gods. lt is self-consciously aware of their disappearance and this presents 
a philosophical response to the problem. [ ... ] 5. The project of self-knowledge 
forces us to distinguish between two rationalities: calculative, transactional ra­
tionality and universal, transformative rationality. 6. The former is based upon a 
fundamental secularism inherent to much of contemporary Mahäbhärata schol­
arship. 7. This view proves to be untenable, since the Mahäbhärata is a work of 
the Spirit. l- .. J 11. The proper approach to the text thus proves to be an attitude 
of philosophical piety. One needs to be initiated into the text; it will not disclose 
its secrets to the researcher who approaches it without the proper respect.22 
At this point the conclusion is inevitable that here someone with a 
rather moderate knowledge of the subject has found his own ways to 
19 Ibid., p. 282. 
20 This, by the way, is the second sentence in the examples in Stenzler's famous begin­
ner's grammar for Sanskrit. 
21 Ibid., p. 41. 
22 lbid., p. 42f. 
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pretend an expertise that reaches far beyond bis peers, even beyond 
"Geisteswissenschaft" itself. 
Prejudice 
To this we may add another oddity of the case. Adluri has one rec­
curing theme in bis more recent writings. Apparently he has identified 
the very school that has got it all wrong as "German Indology". This 
seems to have become a veritable obsession he imagines to share with 
many others. In a brief book review, where he states "With this book, 
Nicholson joins the growing chorus of scholars aware of the problems 
with German Indological scholarship and its hegemonic domination of 
Indian studies",23 he uses the adjective "German" eighteen times. 
In contemporary American writings of post-colonial persuasion the 
adjective "German" has a similar tinge as in Hollywood blockbusters, 
and rightly used is guaranteed to elicit laughter, or horror. This is es­
pecially true for books about "orientalism", a field that has attracted a 
large crowd of writers from interdisciplinary and even distant fields of 
study. What is meant by German in "German Indology" is, however, not 
as obvious as it seems. Of course, one could identify a variety of factors 
(place of birth, mother tongue, academic training) that make a scholar 
of Sanskrit a "German lndologist", but usually one of these factors is 
considered sufficient for awarding the title, for if we demand all of 
them, the often quoted "German Indologists" could not be thus named. 
Many bad no German parents, no German passport, were not working 
in Germany etc. For example, Böhtlingk studied in Germany, but was 
never German by nationality and lived elsewhere for most of bis life. 
His teacher Lassen was Norwegian. Winternitz and Strauss were living 
within the Jewish academic community of Prague, but teaching at the 
"German University" there. Austrian lndologists are in these works as 
a rule regarded as "German Indologists" in the negative sense of the 
world. But iflanguage is the main criterium, then Max Müller ceases to 
be a German Indologist. Iftraining in Germany is crucial, then Charles 
23 Vishwa Adluri, Review of Uni.fj,ing Hinduism: Philosophy and Jdentity in Hindu Jntel­
lectual History by Andrew J. Nicholson, Humanities and Social Sciences Online (H-Net), 
22nd March 2012, http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=32207. 
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Rockwell Lanman or even Angelo de Gubernatis could be counted. 
Thus, in fact, the category "German Indology" is one with open or arbi­
trary boundaries, and for this reason, to be made a member of it, another 
of the criteria that are generally associated with Germany or invoked in 
the genre of orientalist writings24 has to be present. On the contrary, in 
the case of Indologists that are not German, racist or antisemitic ideas 
do not enter the equation. An absurd case is - as Grünendahl has re­
cently shown25 - Oldenberg, who is castigated for views that he most 
probably picked up from, at least shared with his British mentor Rhys 
Davids, who - lacking the "German" context - is not thus indicted. 
Astonishingly, authors who are usually ready to deconstruct the at­
tribution of so-called essences to Asian cultures by former generations 
of "Gennan" Indologists, have apparently no problem with understand­
ing an essence of "German culture" that allows them to say with confi­
dence who is German and who is not. lt is, of course, a safe game and 
therefore a field, in which the aspiring post-colonialist can exercise his 
urge to make a point: while the allegation of a complicity with nazism 
is sure to strike a chord, even when lacking in evidence, 26 any defense 
can rhetorically be turned into a proof of the allegation. 
This being said about a wide-spread North-American perception of 
"German lndology", one ought to note that there is a considerable am­
bivalence. American Indology, which has its roots in several European 
academic cultures, seems to quarrel with them from time to time, and 
within this context the question of "German Indology" within North­
American academia is understood best.27 But for one trying to score 
academically, to write about German Orientalism is a field like no other, 
for without great demands on one's historical knowledge one can eas­
ily make politically correct claims with minimal chances of criticism. 
24 "For English readers today who associate Germany principally with horrendous
crimes against humanity and National Socialism [ ... ]". Edward W. Said: Humanism and 
Democratic Criticism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004, p. 94f. 
25 "History in the Making: On Sheldon Pollock's "NS Indology" and Vishwa Adluri's 
"Pride and Prejudice". ln: International Journal of Hindu Studies 16.2 (2012), p. 29. 
26 Grünendahl has provided ample evidence for this in his various articles. 
27 This is a perspective introduced by Robert Goldman in his introduction "Indologies:
German and Other" to Sanskrit and 'Orientalism': Indology and Comparative Linguistics 
in Germany, 1750-1958. Edited by Douglas T. McGetchin, Peter K.J. Park and Damodar 
SarDesai, Manohar, 2004. 
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The case of Stucblik and bis book on Frauwallner is a good example. 
Altbougb lacking in many respects28 it was publisbed by tbe Austrian 
Academy, since a rejection would bave laid tbem bare to political criti­
cism. lt is tbus not astonishing tbat Adluri too sbould bave recently 
identified his enemies as "German". In his "Pride and Prejudice: Orien­
talism and German Indology", 29 he bas tried - while feeding on Pollock 
- to defend the thesis of an intrinsic connection of German Indology
witb NS ideology. In short, Adluri subscribes to tbe view tbat tbere is
a "complicity oflndology in National Socialism",30 and immunizes bis
position by claiming tbat to doubt tbis view is in itself proof tbat tbis
complicity is not over.31 
Before going into few details, one ougbt to note that the more ac­
ademic part of Adluri's problems witb Indology can be viewed as a 
simple reenactment of tbe quarre! between tbe two camps of Homeric 
studies as applied to Indian texts. 32 With queer arguments Adluri tri es 
to be on the side of tbose wbo think that the texts as given or transmit­
ted in the Indian tradition have to be made sense of, against those who 
are more interested in tbe prebistory of texts, tbeir strata etc., witb his 
own interests being mostly limited to tbe Mahäbhärata. Surely, there 
are valid arguments for and against botb positions, at least the present 
writer considers it meaningless to take sides, simply for tbe reason that 
a vulgata text, whatever its origin - if it can be known at all - of course 
has a Iife of its own, and deserves being studied in its own right, but that 
view does not rule out a study of its history by applying tbe metbod of 
textual criticism to it. For Adluri this conflict is an ideological one, with 
28 See only the most recent review by Rüdiger Schmitt: "Ist "arisch" heute nur noch 
als Vokabel des Nationalsozialismus zu verstehen? Zu einem neuen Buch über den In­
dologen Erich Frauwallner." In: Philologia Fenno-Ugrica 166-17 (2010-2011), p. 49-
64. The reviewer goes as far as to doubt even Stuchlik's archival work because of his
"Voreingenommenheit und des Mangels an Objektivität, die Stuchlik nicht gerade zum
Erforscher der Zeitgeschichte prädestinieren" (p. 62). His main argument he considers as
"völlig gescheitert" (ibid.).
29 international Journal of Hindu Studies 15.3(2011), p. 253-292.
30 Op. Cit., p. 258. Here, once, the adjective German is missing, but implied.
31 "lndeed, Grünendahl's overhasty and unthinking reaction suggests that Pollock's
analysis might be profitably extended forward to German lndology even in its post-war 
period." (op. cit., p. 259) 
32 lt should be remembered that by training he is a philosopher with interests in the
presocratic authors, not an Indologist. 
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German (as expected) Indologists occupying one side ofthe spectrum,33 
but he tries to go further than his predecessors by calling the works of 
some Indologists simply "Nazi scholarship".34 lt is difficult to under­
stand why a student of Gennan philosophy from the prestigious New 
York based New School of Social Research, which has been always 
proud of its famous German emigrants, can entertain such a one-dimen­
sional view of German academia. 
I will not go into the many details of willful misinterpretations of my 
own work, only one instance that is revealing: my critique of Malinar 
for excluding indigenous commentaries - to which Adluri in other cir­
cumstances would surely have agreed - he comments as: "Remarkably, 
Hanneder does not fault Malinar for her sweeping gesture of excluding all 
Indian commentators on the specious grounds that they are inconsistent 
and biased, but for not making an example of them as inconsistent and bi­
ased! From bis perspective, Gennan scholars need only take note oflndi­
an commentators to show that they are wrong." (lbid., p. 264) The reader 
ofthe original35 will notice that I am saying something quite different.36 
33 Writing on the Bhagavadgitä, he states: "Thus, whereas German commentators
freely tailored the text to their particular polemical or ideological ends, Indian commen­
tators all acknowledge a roughly 700-verse text as authoritative." A few lines later we 
read: "Von Stietencron's gross generalization typifies the deficient historical conscious­
ness that, according to Pollock, fatally impaired Indology's capacity for self-reflection." 
lbid., p.263. 
14 "To my knowledge, no German reviewer has called attention to the glaring contra­
diction between uncritically repeating Nazi scholarship and yet excluding Indian schol­
arship on the grounds that it is not objective." lbid., p. 263. Also in public letters he is 
ready to allege such connections: "I cannot imagine that in the 21 st century, this form of 
open support for Nazism and academic bullying and censorship can occur without any 
compunction at a university such as Marburg." (Open letter to the faculty of foreign phi­
lologies dated 24.4.12). 
" I quote from my review: "Obgleich angesichts des Umfanges völlig verständlich, 
ist ein möglicher methodischer Schwachpunkt der systematische Ausschluß der klassis­
chen indischen Kommentartradition (p. 22; über die Sekundärliteratur wird jedoch eine 
Auswahl miteinbezogen, p. 62). Denn einer tendenziösen Interpretation durch einheimis­
che Kommentatoren kann man wohl kaum durch deren Ausschluß begegnen; andernfalls 
setzt man sich der Gefahr aus, mit der einheimischen Rezeption auch den spezifisch indis­
chen "Verständnishorizont" auszublenden, der eventuell historisch Richtiges bewahrt." 
ZDMG 151.l (2001), S. 240.
36 A similar diagnosis is reached by Grünendahl, who says that "in most cases the
discrepancy between Adluri's charge and what I actually wrote is evident to anyone who 
cares to follow up his references to my articles." Op. cit., p. 8. 
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What makes it furthermore difficult to take his arguments very se­
riously is his general ignorance of the history of Indology. He says: 
"The history ofreception of Hauer's thought suggests that many other 
Indologists were receptive to his ideas."37 This merely shows that he 
has not read or understood the relevant literature. The fact is that they 
were mostly not, and this has been shown already, in a work Adluri 
quotes, but choses to ignore here.38 But while Ruhen wrote in 1934 that 
Hauer's new "Indology" was religously motivated,39 and therefore not 
to be taken seriously, we read still in 1949 that "J.W. Hauer, a Sanskrit 
scholar who served for some years as a missionary in India, gives to the 
Gitä a central place in German faith."40 Apparently it was difficult for 
an outsider to discem that this statement was part of Hauer's own brand 
of an "Aryan" religion, one for which he found no followers amongst 
German Indologists. Adluri prefers to be unaware of such disturbances 
ofhis simplistic theories, since nothing is to disturb the overall picture 
of a supposedly monolithic German lndology. 
And finally: his general ignorance of Indological personalia has 
not kept Adluri from making absurd connections. Although he says 
that "Ad hominem attacks appear to be accepted practice in German 
Indology",41 he states the very same page: "Interestingly, Hanneder is 
Slaje's student, so that there would appear to be a consistent line one 
can trace from Frauwallner to Slaje to Hanneder."42 lt was apparently 
too tempting to bring two contemporary scholars into connection with 
the Austrian Sanskritist, who he thinks has just been exposed as a NS­
Indologist. This, above all, shows Adluris ignorance about the actual 
students ofFrauwallner: Slaje is not one ofthem, actually he never even 
met him, and just by being Austrian does not automatically become 
37 Op. cit., p. 264.
38 See Jürgen Hanneder: Indologie im Umbruch. Zur Geschichte des Faches in Marburg 
1845-1945. Antrittsvorlesung. München: Kirchheim Verlag 2010 (Indologica Mar­
purgensia !), p. 55-57. 
39 "Hauer treibt seine Indologie ja nicht aus philologischem oder historischem Inter­
esse, sondern aus religiösem". Review in ZDMG 87 (1934), p. 89. 
40 The statement was made by the former Oxford professor of Indian Religion and 
Ethics S. Radhakrishnan in his The Bhagavadgita, London: George Allen and Unwin 1949, 
p. 11.
41 Op. cit., p. 260.
42 Op. cit., p. 282. 
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one.43 If such accusations were not directed against the "bad guys", the 
country that stands for "crimes against humanity" {Said), one would not 
hesitate to call it an extreme case of prejudice, or a form of academical 
racism. 
Further analysis of contents is, I think, unnecessary, but one wonders 
about the context of this strange case. Is it merely an awkward form 
of pretence for Indological leaming combined with a prejudice against 
the label "German", variously applied to what one dislikes. Or is it like 
a reverse version of Sokal's Hoax an attempt to prove that, 1ike the 
editors of the joumal Social Text who accepted a mock artic1e, Ger­
man Indology has lost its critical acumen? The latter conclusion is not 
as unlikely as it seems. Adluri has recent]y announced a monographi­
cal work against German Indology to appear soon,44 while at the same 
time he earned a Ph.D. in lndo]ogy from Marburg University. Since 
the candidate bad insulted "German Indology" as a whole, a11 German 
{German speaking?) lndological scholars were excluded, in order to 
avoid possible bias. First Indological reactions against Adluri's strange 
ideas have been unambiguous.45 The latest just appeared in Zeitschrift 
für Südasienstudien 28 (2012), where Hans Harder, Angelika Malinar 
and Thomas Oberlies, in an editorial note on fighting "discrimination, 
racism and sexism", reject his work on the following grounds: 
lt is very necessary to critically examine the ideological orientations of schol­
arship, but not to use a thin body of dispersed evidence to shower polemics on a 
whole discipline in German academia along with its methodology. This so hap­
pened in certain essays that have latterly appeared in academic journals (see Vol­
ume 19. no.2, Spring 2011, oftheJournal o.f Vaishnava Studies and Volume 15 no.1 
4' Of course, Adluri would not know my main academical teachers, who are Frie­
drich Wilhelm (Munich), Friedrich Sprockhoff (Bochum), Claus Vogel (Bonn), Tilak 
Raj Chopra (Bonn), Michael Hahn (Marburg), Alexis Sanderson (Oxford). Only as a 
post-doc I worked in the Mok1opäya project supervised by Walter Slaje in Halle and have 
worked with him in various projects since. Tue second generation of my "teachers" (none 
of whom I ever met) would thus not include Frauwallne1; but for instance Ruben, von 
Glasenapp, Nobel etc. - whatever that means. 
44 The Nay Science. Announced as to appear in Oxford University Press 2012, in 
which he promises "an analysis of the deep Lutheran ressentiment this recurring Gestalt 
of German epic scholarship reveals" (Journal of Vaishnava Studies 19.2 (2010), p.21.). 
For this "Gestalt", that is, German scholarship on the Indian epic, he quotes Goldstücker, 
who - being Jewish - would probably not have been too happy with this absurdly unin­
formed allegation. 
45 See Grünendahl as quoted above.
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ofthe International Journal of Hindu Studies). And there is more to come, since two 
ofthe offending authors have announced their intention to publish a monograph to 
be titled: The Nay Science: A History ofGerman Indology. 
These defamatory excesses are pegged to a critique of a certain 
methodology for analyzing texts - what has come to be known as tex­
tual criticism. But at bottom, German Indology, understood as some 
timeless, essentialized entity, is the sole target of these denigrations. 
This is made abundantly clear by the fact that they exempt, say, Ameri­
can and British lndologists from their torrents of abuse, although the 
methodology of these authors is not different. Scholarly controversy is 
one thing - polemics distorting the proclaimed opponent's views some­
thing rather different. We may weil ask: how could essays ofthis calibre 
ever be published in the above journals? 
Those that fall prey to this mixture of pretence and prejudice - more 
likely in neighboring fields than in Sanskrit philology itself - may later 
have to bear the same question that was put to the editors of Social Text 
in a review: 
"How does it feel being duped by the half-educated?"46 
Supplement by Michael Hahn 
In addition to the remarks by Jürgen Hanneder I would like to single 
out the following two points in relation to the paper of Dr. Adluri. lt 
seems that he, in the same vague and inaccurate manner rightly criti­
cized by Juergen Hanneder, wishes to place me in the paramparä of 
"Nazi Indology" whatever this sasasfllga or vandhyäputra may be. Not 
only in view of my published writings, but also in view of my fam­
ily background this is the most absurd and baseless allegation I can 
think of. The recommendation of the legal department of the Philipps 
University Marburg to the Dean of the Faculty of Foreign Languages 
(Fachbereich Fremdsprachliche Philologien) to release me from the 
task as supervisor and reviewer of Dr. Adluri's thesis can, I believe, be 
defended under these very specific circumstances. However, whether it 
41' Quoted in Sokal: Beyond the Hoax, p. 149. 
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was wise, to exclude, on the same grounds, as reviewers not only those 
contemporary German indologists mentioned in Dr. Adluri's diatribe 
against "German Indology," but all indologists currently teaching at 
German universities may be doubted. 
While this surely is a very convenient means - especially for some­
one who wishes to receive academic distinctions in a tradition he so 
fervently attacks - to sort out unwanted reviewers, the docility of tht 
other parties involved remains puzzling. 
